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Targeted Transfers, Investment Spillovers, and the Tax Environment 
1.  Introduction 
Both local and national governments compete vigorously to attract business investment.  Fourteen years 
ago, government authorities in Alabama shocked numerous commentators when they offered Mercedes Benz 
over $250 million in site improvements, infrastructure, tax incentives and training to entice the automaker to 
locate its first American plant in the Alabama town of Vance.  The amount offered was almost equal to the total 
cost of building the plant.  Seven years ago, the city of Chicago made headlines when its offer of $63 million of 
tax and other incentives successfully wooed Boeing to choose the city for the new location of its corporate 
headquarters.   Such stories have become a common feature of the American scene, perhaps most obviously in 
the case of efforts of local governments to attract sports franchises. The scenario also plays out in the 
international stage as technological changes and increased capital mobility increasingly broaden the geographic 
areas over which firms may choose to locate. For example, Germany offered sizable transfers to induce Dow 
Chemical to invest in plants in the former East Germany as part of an overall development plan.   
There are two closely related economic justifications for government subsidization of private capital 
projects within their jurisdictions.  One reason suggested in Pepall (1990) and recently given emphasis by 
Rodrik (2004) is based on key information externalities associated with the investment location choices of 
firms.  In an uncertain world, the profit opportunities associated with a specific region may be learned either 
by direct experience or by observing the experience of others.  When a high profile firm initiates a major 
capital project in a particular underdeveloped area that investment decision reveals information regarding the 
profitability of that location choice to other firms and this information is akin to a public good.  The firm 
making the initial investment cannot extract payment for provision of this service. Unless transfers are made 
the standard under-provision result for public goods will hold, and will result in too few major investment 
projects in underdeveloped regions.   
 A second and closely related reason for targeted transfers or tax breaks is offered by Garcia-Mia and 
McGuire (2002), among others.  The argument is again based on an externality, but one that in this case stems 
from agglomeration effects.  There are external economies so that while capital is subject to diminishing   3
returns at the individual firm level, there are positive scale effects from having capital concentrated within a 
region.  Here again, attracting investment projects is welfare enhancing because it creates a more favorable 
business climate and so leads to capital expansion by other firms.  Such externalities have been empirically 
documented by Rauch (1993) and Henderson (2001) among others.   
These arguments both share the common feature that a part of the gain to the local government from a 
major corporate investment project stems from the spillover investments that the initial project induces. As an 
empirical matter though, the extent of the gains from such follow-on investments remains unclear. In addition 
to the studies mentioned above, Keller and Yeaple (2004) find strong evidence of sizeable spillovers to US 
manufacturing firms from foreign direct investment in the US between the years 1987 and 1996. Similarly, 
Greenstone and Moretti (2004) find that winning a “million dollar plant”, while costly, increases local property 
values without creating fiscal ruin. However these results stand in contrast to other empirical studies, such as 
Hanson (2001) and Gorg and Greenaway (2002) who find that FDI spillovers can be relatively small or non-
existent.  Indeed, the spillover effects could even be negative if they lead to important congestion problems as 
critics of these development projects frequently claim. 
The spillovers associated with ancillary or subsequent investments will be realized only when the initial 
investment does in fact lead to these investments taking place.  This in turn will depend on how ancillary firms 
interpret the first firm’s decision to invest in the area and the government’s decision regarding the size of a 
targeted subsidy paid to that first firm.  This paper explores how the information conveyed by the first or target 
firm’s investment decision and the government’s targeted subsidy affects the investment decisions of later 
investors.  Specifically we are interested how the general corporate tax environment affects the information or 
signaling role of the targeted subsidy.   Our results show how the signaling role of transfers is affected by the 
overall tax environment.  We show in fact that a lower tax environment, somewhat paradoxically, makes it more 
costly for a local government to use targeted transfers successfully to induce both primary and secondary 
investments in their communities. Our results also help account for the mixed empirical evidence on the 
spillovers created by the initial investment.  Similarly sized transfers may be associated with either suboptimally 
low investment or suboptimally high investment depending on the tax and investment spillover environment.   4
 2.  The Model 
Suppose that a multiregional or highly visible firm is seeking a location for a major new investment project. 
The value of the firm’s project will depend upon both the nature of the project and where the project is located. 
Location affects both the operating costs and conditions of the new facility.  Certain operating costs, such as 
labor, shipping, construction and energy costs, as well as taxes may or may not vary much across the possible 
location sites.  However, other costs of doing business depend upon the quality of public services or the local 
public infrastructure in the area.  These are typically difficult to measure and can vary across locations 
especially in regards to their cost implications for the specific project.   
Location decisions are a matching problem—both for the firm making the investment and for the 
government interested in attracting investment.  A good match occurs when the initial investment is a good 
quality project and the area’s infrastructure is well suited to such an opportunity. A bad match occurs when the 
investment is a poor quality project and/or the area cannot adequately support the project.  When the match is a 
good one and the first firm invests in the area, then we assume that the region offers attractive investment 
opportunities for other firms. The converse holds if the match is a bad one.  The actual quality of a match is, 
however, private information revealed to firm and the government when they enter into negotiations.  Such 
information cannot be easily and credibly communicated to other investors.  So, if the first firm does invest in 
the region, follower firms must make a conjecture about whether the match is a good one and whether to follow 
and make their own investments in the region.
1 
We formalize this problem as follows.  The surplus, denoted by S, generated by the initial firm’s 
investment depends on the quality of the match, which in turn depends upon the nature of the project π and the 
strength of the local infrastructure i.  We assume that both π and i are independent random variables with each 
drawn from a uniform distribution between 0 and 1, and S = πi.  The probability density function of the surplus 
is f(S) = –ln S. and the mean or average surplus E(S) =1/4. The firm is likely to know the project’s quality—
                                                           
1 Our model is related to that of Bond and Samuelson (1986).  Their analysis does not address the complementary 
investments issue but instead focuses on a case in which the government has complete information and in which the 
principle concern is the time-inconsistency of government policy.   5
the value of π, but not the value of the local infrastructure i. Similarly the government is likely to know the 
value of the local infrastructure i—but not the quality of the firm’s investment project π.   
The firm and the government can learn the value of investment project or S if they enter into negotiations 
with each other.   If they do and they learn the value of the match then at this point the government can decide 
to offer a transfer T to attract the firm’s investment project to the area.  When the infrastructure in the region is 
relatively poor and i< ½, then the firm would not locate in the region unless it receives a transfer from the 
government.  The government has potentially two reasons to offer such an incentive. First, the firm’s 
investment could generate additional tax revenues that the government can use to finance the transfer. 
Specifically, if the corporate tax rate isτ, then the government will earn τ S when the firm locates its project in 
the area. We assume that τ has a common value across all the regions under consideration by the firm, and so 
the value of τ reflects the general tax environment.   
A second reason to offer a transfer is that the government may enjoy gains if ancillary investments follow 
the initial firm’s investment lead. The degree of spillovers to the government from subsequent investments is 
measured by a parameter α, and spillovers to the government from subsequent investments are equal to αS.  
We assume that in any location the parameter α is a random draw from a uniform distribution [-a, a], where 
0 < a < 1, and that the value of α is local information, known to the local government and the potential 
ancillary investors in the region.  However, similar to of the local infrastructure, the parameter α is learned by 
the initial investing firm upon negotiations with the local government. We also assume that in all cases to be 
considered the corporate tax rate and the degree of spillovers are such that τ  + α < 1.   
The parameter α measures the various ways in which the follow-on ancillary investments can confer 
advantages or disadvantages to the government or region.  For example, α > 0 could imply complementarities 
that make it less expensive to provide government services.  It may become less expensive to provide 
schooling or sanitation services in a prosperous economic environment, or further development made by the 
follow on firms may lead to the private provision of some services, e.g., health care, parks, and education, that   6
again frees up local government resources.  On the other hand α could also be negative if ancillary investments 
generate congestion or other negative externalities.   
It is clear that when τ +α  > 0 the government has an incentive to attract the first firm to invest in the area. 
However, it is profitable for subsequent investors to invest only if the match is a good one, or only if the 
surplus S >1/4. These follow-on investor firms do not directly observe the value of S.  These firms do know 
the local conditions summarized by α, and the distribution of S.  They also observe whether the first firm 
invests in the region and the size of any transfer T the firm received from the government. Let I  ∈{0,1} denote 
whether the first firm makes the investment in the area.  The information set upon which an ancillary investing 
firm bases its belief on the likelihood of a good match is therefore θ = [I, T]. We denote the belief of a follower 
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will invest in the area. 
We begin with the case in which there is no corporate tax, or τ  = 0.  Because the total surplus S =πi goes 
entirely to the firm and because the expected quality of infrastructure in another region is i = ½, the firm will 
choose this region if the firm learns that the local infrastructure has i > ½.
2 The government will not offer a 
transfer and the ancillary firms observe I = 1 and T = 0. In this case the ancillary firms are able to deduce that 
the infrastructure must be such that i> ½.  The belief of an ancillary firm that the match is a good one when i > 








⎛ = = ≥ T I S µ . The expected profit of an ancillary firm is positive and the ancillary firm will 
also invest in the area.   
Our interest, however, is when the infrastructure in the region is underdeveloped or poor and i< ½, and 
the first firm would not invest in the area without a targeted transfer.
 For the benchmark case in whichτ = 0, 
the local government gains from the initial investment project only if α > 0, and the government is able to 
attract ancillary investors and earn αS.  When α > 0 the local government may have an incentive to offer the 
                                                           
2We simplify the analysis by not extensively modeling the firm’s search process.  It simply invests if  S = iπ > E(S) = 1/4.   7
first firm a transfer T where T < αS.  We characterize the equilibrium for this benchmark case with the 
following proposition. 
Proposition 1: Whenτ  = 0, i< ½ and α > 0 there exists a separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium such 
that: when S > ¼, and ½  ≥ i ≥ 1/2(1+α) the government offers a transfer 4 α ≥ T  and the firm invests 
in the area and ancillary investors follow and invest in the area as well. When either S < ¼, or when S 
> ¼ but i < 1/2(1+α), then the government offers no transfer, and there is no investment by the first 



































⎛ = ≥ T I S µ . 
Proof: (See Appendix) 
The benchmark equilibrium outcome is described in Figure 1.
3  Region I shows the area of efficient 
matches where investment occurs because of transfers.  The government offers a transfer T > α/4 and both the 
first and secondary investments occur.   Region II describes the area in which matches are inefficient and the 
investment does not occur. In this region the government is not able to offer a transfer T > α/4 large enough to 
induce any follow-on investments.  Region III describes an area of potential inefficiency. Here, the match is a 
good one and the environment is a good for ancillary investments, but neither the first nor the secondary 
investments occur. This reason is that the initial investment project has a relatively high value withπ ≥ (1+α)/2 
but the local infrastructure is so low, i < 1/2(1+α), that the government cannot afford to offer a transfer large 
enough to attract the initial firm’s investment. In other words, in this case we have αS + S <π/2 when i < 
1/2(1+α). The firm does better to locate elsewhere.  Yet it is possible that the overall surplus generated by the 
ancillary investments, had they occurred, would have generated gains for all parties.  This outcome is 
potentially inefficient.  It reflects the usual under-provision effects when there are positive externalities. 
There is another feature worth noting about the benchmark equilibrium described by Proposition 1. When 
transfers do occur (Region 1), they are such that the government transfers much of its gains to the first 
investor. That is, since i < ½ and π ≤ 1, the maximum S < 1/2, the government’s potential surplus of αS < α/2. 
                                                           
3 In this and all other figures, we omit the region for which i > ½, as no transfer is needed in this region.     8
Since the necessary transfer is T ≥ α/4, the government must give more than half of its gains away.  
Furthermore, the share that the government gets to keep falls as the quality of its infrastructure i declines.  
Governments with poor public infrastructures (for this specific project) will either be unable to afford a 
transfer (Regions II and III) or, make a transfer that attracts the initial investment but that leaves them with 
little net gain. 
Consider now the case in which there is a positive corporate tax rateτ >0, levied independently but 
identical across all regions that the first firm is considering for its investment. We assume, not unreasonably, 
that 1/2 >τ > 0.  The presence of a corporate profit tax means that government can gain from the initial 
investment even when no ancillary investments occur.  Specifically, the government can collect τS in additional 
revenue if the initial investment project is undertaken.  The corporate tax rate gives both an added incentive for 
the government to attract the project and a greater pool of resources from which to finance any targeted transfer.   
Matches that are not attractive to ancillary investors could in this case be attractive to the local government.  
And because i < ½ these poorer matches must be associated with a transfer T > 0 for the initial investment to 
occur.  An important consequence of the corporate income tax is that the signaling potential of the transfer T 
becomes obscured.   
To work out the equilibrium when the corporate tax τ > 0, observe first that when i< ½ and ½ >τ >0 the 
first firm will locate in the area only if it receives a transfer T such that 
2
) 1 ( ) 1 (
π
τ τ − ≥ + − T S .  That is, the 
firm will invest only if the transfer )
2
1
( ) 1 ( i T − − ≥ π τ . We define by TL the minimum transfer that the 
government must offer the first firm to attract its investment, or )
2
1
( ) 1 ( ) , ( i i TL − − = π τ π . If the first firm 
receives T > TL(π,i) the firm has an incentive to locate in the area. For the government to finance T > TL(π,i) 
when ancillary firms do not invest in the area follows that  0 ) , ( ≥ − i T S L π τ , or 
2
) 1 ( τ −
≥ i .     9
However, when ancillary investors do follow and also invest in the region and when the spillovers are 
positive, the government has a potentially larger surplus equal to S ) ( α τ + from which to finance a transfer T. 
We define TH to be the transfer that makes the government indifferent between offering a high transfer TH to 
attract the first firm as well as ancillary investors and offering the lower transfer TL and attracting only the first 
firm to the area. That is,  ) , ( ) , ( ) ( i T S i T S L H π τ π α τ − = − +  and so ) , ( ) , ( i T i i T L H π απ π + = .  When the 
infrastructure is such that 
2
) 1 ( τ −
≥ i  and  0 > α the government is indifferent between offering the transfer TH 
and attracting subsequent investors, or a lower transfer TL that does not attract them.  For the government to be 
indifferent it must transfer some of its gain from ancillary investments to the targeted first firm.  
When 
2
) 1 ( τ −
< i the government is able to finance a transfer sufficiently large to attract the first firm only 
when spillovers are positive and it can tap into the surplus  S α generated from the ancillary investments.  
Specifically, when










i the government can offer a transfer T where (τ+α)S > T > TL(π,i)  to 
attract the first firm. However when the region’s infrastructure is poorer and 






< i , then even in the 
case of positive spillovers, the government is unable to finance a transfer sufficiently large to attract the first 
firm to the area. 
Consider first the outcome when there is a relatively low tax environment with positive spillovers or 
whenτ ≤ α  and as before 1/2 >τ >0, and τ + α < 1.
4 Proposition 2 below describes this case. 
Proposition 2: When 0 <τ ≤ α  and ½ >τ >0, and τ + α < 1, then there exists the following hybrid perfect 
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≥ H T  then the government will offer 
4
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≥ T  and 
the firm will invest in the area.  
                                                           
4 If we assume that the government gains from the ancillary investments are also due to taxes, then α ≥ τ is equivalent to 
assuming that the secondary surplus is greater than or equal to the surplus generated by the first project.   10
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III(i) When  i >
−
2
) 1 ( τ
and S < ¼, or III(ii) when i >
+
−




and, S > ¼, then the government will not 
offer the firm a transfer or T = 0,  and the firm will not invest in the area. 
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⎛ ≥ T I S µ they do.
5 
Proof: (see Appendix).   
The possible equilibrium outcomes described in Proposition 2 are illustrated by Figures 2(a), 2(b), and 3, 
which are drawn for a tax rate τ = 0.3.
6 The regions labeled I, II, and III, (corresponding to the various parts of 
Proposition 2), describe the matches for which the government has an incentive to offer transfers TH higher 
than the minimum TL, to offer the transfer TL, or to offer no transfer, respectively.   The incentives of the 
government affect the beliefs of the ancillary investors about the relationship between the transfer observed 
                                                           
5 To complete the beliefs held by ancillary investors recall that if these investors observe an investment and no transfer they 



















⎛ = ≥ T I S µ . 
6 For these figures, we take the illustrative case of τ = 0.3 and α either equal to 0.3 (Figure 2a) or greater than 0.3 (Figure 
2b).  As stated in the text, these figures are specific examples of the general case of α ≥τ.   11
and the likelihood of a good match.  When the transfer is higher than TL, the ancillary firms can deduce a good 
match. To see how, observe that when 
2
) 1 ( τ −
= i and S= 1/4, or alternatively when





= , then the high 
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7  The government in this case is just 















< i TL that attracts only the first firm but no the ancillary investors. Of course, there are a 
number of other matches for which this is also the case.  The dark red curve separating regions I (i) and II(i) 







= i TH intersects i 
= 1/2 at π = 1 in Figure 2(a).  As shown in the Appendix, this is always the case when the value of α =τ.  







= i TH  curve rotates leftward as shown in Figure 2(b).  Observe as well that 
increases in α lead to α > (1-2τ) and so unlike Figure 2(a), there is no region III(ii) in Figure 2(b). 
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τ α
µ T I S  consider Figure 3. It 
is the same as Figure 2(a) with α =τ = 0.3, except that some additional contours have been added. Each 
contour reflects the various combinations of i and π that yield the same value of the minimum transfer TL.  




i . Higher values of TL correspond to lower contours. 
The relevant portion of each contours starts from the i = (1-τ)/2, (intersection point one) and continues 
northeastward to cross the S = ¼ (intersection point two) and then crosses the curve describing the set of 
matches corresponding to TH = (α+τ)/4 (intersection point three).  Denote the π value associated with each of 
these three points as π1, π2, and π3, respectively. The curvature of the contour, as defined by the ratio of the 
                                                           







= i TH always begins at the intersection of  i = 
(1 - τ)/2 and the S=π i = 1/4.     12
absolute value of the second derivative to the first derivative, is 2/π and, therefore, decreasing inπ. The contour 
thus flattens out as one moves from left to right.  As shown in the Appendix, when α =τ, π2 is horizontally 
equidistant from both π1 and π3.  From the decreasing curvature of these contours it therefore follows that the 
arc length of the contour is greater over its leftward portion in which π rises from π1 to π2 than it is over its 
rightward portion in which π rises from π2 to π3.  Of course, this same relative arc length comparison will also 
hold when α >τ , as this relationship implies that the curve TH = (α + τ)/4, is rotated leftward and so reduces 
the value of π3 while leaving π1 and π2 unchanged.  
The regions of interest in Figure 3 are II(i), and II(ii). In II(i) the match is a good one (S ≥1/4) but the 
government prefers to offer the lower transfer TL rather than a higher transfer T ≥ (α+τ)/4.  The government also 
prefers to offer the lower transfer TL in Region II(ii) where the match is not a good one (S <1/4).  From the 
viewpoint of the ancillary firms the matches in Regions II(i) and II(ii) are indistinguishable.  All that these firms 
observe in these cases is the payment of a transfer TL and the entry of the first firm.  However, since there are 
many i and π combinations with the same observed TL, and since for any α ≥ τ, more than half of these lie in 
Region II(ii) where S < 1/4, the ancillary firms reasonably conjecture that the entry of the first firm does not 
imply a good environment for their investment.   
The remaining regions in Figure 3 are III(i) and III(ii).  In these regions, no transfer is offered and no entry 
occurs.  This is not surprising as the local infrastructure i is a particularly bad match for the project.  However, 
as in the no-tax case of Figure 1, there is a small region in which the lack of entry reflects a welfare loss, 
namely, Region III(ii).   
Observe that for a given α > 0, Proposition 2 converges to Proposition 1 as the corporate tax rate τ 
converges to zero. It is equally important to note that, once again, for the government to induce the first firm to 
make the initial investment requires that it give in transfer half or more of its realized gains as measured either 
byτS, or (α+τ)S .  In regions I(i) and I(ii), in which the ancillary firms also  invest, this result is simply an 
extension of the same finding in Proposition 1.  However, in regions II(i) and II(ii), in which only the target first   13
firm invests, this finding follows from observing that the transfer TL = ) i ( ) ( − −
2
1
1 π τ > 
2
) ( π τ i
, where the latter 
is exactly half of the government’s tax gains in the case of no ancillary investment. 
For a given α >0, increases in the corporate tax rate τ increase the region identified by II(i) where the match 
is a good one but no secondary investments occur.  At some point, a further increase in the tax rate τ will lead to 
τ >α.  Alternatively, decreases in the extent of spillovers α, holding the tax rate constant, will also yield this 
outcome. In either case, the environment becomes one low spillovers relative to the tax rate. The equilibrium 
outcome for this case is described by Proposition 3. 
 Proposition 3: When τ >α  and ½ >τ >0, and τ + α < 1, then there exists the following hybrid perfect 
Bayesian equilibrium:  
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for which TL ≥ T1, the government offers a transfer T ≥ T1 and the target first firm enters the area.   
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a transfer T such that TL ≤ T < T1 and the target first firm will enter the area.  
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offer the first firm a transfer, or T = 0,  and the firm will not invest in the area.   
The equilibrium beliefs of ancillary investors are: 
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Proof: (see Appendix) 
Proposition 3 is described in Figure 4.  Recall that as α falls below τ, the TH = (α + τ)/4 curve rotates 
rightward of the point π = 1, i = 1/2.  This is shown Figure 4 for the case α = 0.15 < τ = 0.4.  Now there are a set 
of matches to the immediate north of TH = (α+τ)/4, such that the government does not have an incentive to offer a 
high transfer T ≥  (α+τ)/4, although the match is a good one.  Moreover, it is also the case that a TL contour with a 
sufficiently high value of TL can now have a longer arc length to the right of the S = 1/4, than to the left.  Both of 
these observations make clear that it is no longer rational for ancillary firms to believe that only transfers for 
which T ≥  (α+τ)/4 indicate good matches and profitable opportunities.  Instead, there is a critical transfer TL = T1, 
such that for an observed transfer T>T1 the ancillary firms work out that the conditional probability that the match 
is a good one is greater than 50% and follow the target firm’s investment. In Figure 4, where α = 0.3 < τ = 0.4 the 
critical value of T1  = 0.0201.  When i ≥ (1 – τ)/2, then for any transfer T ≥ 0.0201, the target first firm will make 
the initial investment and ancillary firms will follow with subsequent investments, but for any transfer T < 0.0201, 
the target firm will make the initial investment but the ancillary firms will not follow and invest in the area.   
  In a high tax (or low spillover) environment, the local government can pay a relatively low subsidy and 
yet still successfully attract both the initial investment of the target firm and the subsequent investment of the 
ancillary firms.   The reason for this is straightforward.  In a high tax (low spillover) environment, the 
government reaps substantial tax benefits from the initial investment itself.  As these gains become large relative 
to the spillover gains from ancillary investments, it becomes less worthwhile for the government to pursue those 
ancillary gains by offering a large tax break or subsidy to the initial firm.  When the ancillary firms understand 
this, however, the informational value of the transfer T declines.  T will no longer vary across regimes of varying 
investment quality.  If T is large enough to induce the first firm to invest it is a decent bet that secondary 
investments will be profitable.  This leads to considerably more secondary investment at a considerably lower 
transfer cost to the government.  One might think that a high tax environment would be one in which a large 
subsidy would be necessary to attract both the initial and ancillary investments.  Yet, as just shown, once the 
signaling role of the transfer is considered, this is not necessarily the case.   15
The differences between Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 also have implications for empirical analysis.  In 
the low tax (high spillover) world of Proposition 2, the government grants a low transfer TL  yet, even then, there 
will be occasions[Region II(i)] there will instances of (suboptimally) no ancillary investment.  In the high tax 
(low spillover) world of Proposition 3, however, the government again grants a low transfer TL yet now there 
will be a good deal of ancillary investment that, with positive probability, will be inefficiently excessive. 
Econometric analysis will have difficulty identifying the marginal impact and benefit of transfers unless they 
control for the signaling environment in which the transfers are offered. 
3.  Concluding Remarks 
Targeted investment transfers are a frequently used policy tool of local and national governments to attract 
new capital projects to their regions.  A common justification for these transfers is that successful attraction of 
the initial investment will generate further gains because of subsequent investments from ancillary firms.  We 
investigate in this paper the way in which a transfer to attract the first major investment in an underdeveloped 
region acts as a signal and leads to other investments in the region. We find that the informational content of the 
signal sent by the initial investment and the transfer depends upon both the overall tax environment and the 
extent of spillover gains created by the ancillary investments.  In a low-tax-relative-to-spillover environment, the 
government enjoys particularly large gains if the ancillary investments take place.  Hence, the government will 
be willing to “pay” a lot for those gains by means of a transfer to the first firm.  As a result, ancillary firms will 
make those subsequent investments only when the government signals that willingness to pay with a large 
transfer to the target firm—so large, in fact, that the government gives away more than half of any potential 
surplus.  
By contrast, when the tax rate is high relative to the spillover gains, the relative importance of the 
ancillary investments to the government falls.  In this setting, the transfer becomes a less precise signal with 
the result that even a low transfer to the target firm is able to attract both the first and the secondary 
investments.  Of course, in all environments the under-provision of information results in some probability that 
no investment will take place, despite the fact that the project quality and government infrastructure are a good 
match for both the initial and subsequent investments.   16
Our results shed light on the mixed empirical findings regarding targeted transfers as a means of attracting 
large, visible investment projects in the hopes that these will lead to ancillary investments.  When the transfer 
plays a signaling role, its ability to induce both primary and secondary investments reflects factors that may 
not have been captured in econometric studies.  Since we also find that the government must typically give 
away more than half of its gains in the targeted transfer, our findings also suggest that evidence of large net 
gains for the community as a result of attracting the initial investment may be difficult to find.  Finally, our 
analysis gives an additional rationale for communities fearing a “race to the bottom” in tax rates.  Beyond the 
direct, revenue-reducing effect of a general fall in tax rates across communities, our model suggests that such a 
move to a lower tax environment will, somewhat paradoxically, makes it more costly for any one local 
government to use targeted transfers successfully to induce both primary and secondary investments in their 
communities.  17
4.  Appendix 
A1. Proof of Proposition 1:  Because i < ½ a transfer T must be paid to attract the firm’s project to the area. 
Since τ  = 0 the transfer T that the local government can pay is financed from the positive spillovers surplus 
of subsequent investments and so T ≤ αS.  However, αS must be sufficient to compensate the firm to invest 
in an area with a relatively weak infrastructure, or αS > π(1/2 – i).  This implies that the government can 
potentially attract the initial investment only if i ≥ 1/2(1+α).  When a transfer T is paid, it must be 
sufficiently large so that the ancillary investors understand the match is a good one and will invest in the 
area and finance the transfer.  Transfers T > α/4 can be offered by good matches only and so the beliefs of 
the ancillary firms are rational  
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A3.  Proof that the distance between π1 and π2  equals the distance between π2  and π3 when α =τ. 
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Note that as the distance must be nonnegative, the value for D1 implies that τ ≥ 4TL. 
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As D1 is independent of α, and as D2 is decreasing in α, it is equally ready to see that D2 becomes larger 
(smaller) than D1 as α rises (falls).  
A4.  Rotation of the TH = (α + τ)/4 curve. 




















by the earlier condition for D1 to be nonnegative. 
A5. Proof of Proposition 2 
Because i < ½ a transfer T must be offered to attract the first mover’s investment to the area. 





> >i . In the region defined by I(i) the value 
of the match S=πi is such that the government can offer a transfer 
4
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> T where 
) , ( ) , ( i T T i T L H π π > ≥ . In the region II(i) and II(ii) the value of the match S=πi is such that the 
government offers the transfer  ) , ( i TL π to attract only the first mover firm to the area.  The government 
does not have an incentive to raise the transfer to 
4
τ α +







and so doing so would make the government worse off. Observe that for values of 
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.  In region III where the match is a bad one, S < ¼, the government is worse off trying to 
finance a transfer sufficiently large either to attract the first mover firm to the area or to attract that firm 
and ancillary investors.  However, in I(ii) where










i  and the match is good, S > ¼, the 
government, because of positive spillovers, can finance a transfer 
4
τ α +
≥ T  and since T >TL  both the   19
government and firm are better off..  However when i >
+
−




and the match is a good one, S > ¼,the 
government is better off not attracting the firm or offering T = 0.  The potential surplus even accounting  
for spillovers is insufficient to compensate the firm for investing in the area. Given the strategies of the 
government and first mover firm, the ancillary investors enter and invest in the area only when they 
observe a transfer 
4
τ α +
≥ T . These firms understand that such transfers can be financed only in good 
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< < L T to attract the firm to the area and these transfers will 
be observed both when the match is a good one, region II(i) and when the match is a bad one, region 
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µ T T I S . This belief is 
rational, because as illustrated above and shown in the Appendix, the arc length of TL in region II(i) is less 






















A6. Proof of Proposition 3 
Because i < ½ a transfer T must be paid to attract the first mover firm’s investment project to the area. 





> >i . In this region, the value of S=πi is such that the government can offer 
a transfer T ≥ TL> T1 sufficient to attract the target firm’s initial investment.  Lowering the transfer below TL  
would lose the firm’s investment, and when T ≥ TL> T1 the target first firm has no incentive to invest elsewhere. 
When ancillary firms observe a transfer T ≥ T1 , and the target firm investing, they believe that 
2
1








⎛ ≥ = ≥ τ α µ T T T I S and make the follow-on investments. In contrast, in Region II, the value of 
S=πi is such that the government can only offer a transfer TL <  T < T1.  This is sufficient to attract the target 












⎛ < = ≥ τ α µ T T T I S . This belief is again rational, as illustrated above and shown formally   20
in the Appendix.  Finally, in Region III in which  i >
−
2
) 1 ( τ








, then the government cannot offer the first firm a positive transfer or T = 0.  In this case, it is 
rational for the target first firm not to invest in the area. Likewise, when ancillary investors do not observe an 
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Figure 2b 
τ = 0.3, α = 0.6 
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Figure 3 
τ = α = 0.3 
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Figure 4 
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